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DOCTRINE OF DIVORCE AT THE TIi1UE OF CHRIST.

Since the
riage;

beinning

and since the bb::ini

cf timo non ,hvc

sought mar-

of time some men have sought

to break up the relation into which they have entered.
As men have attained moral cnlightment they have fel-t

that ,'en,

lvciec

aaight cling to the latter

procedure,

c tiiad out where the wrong lay,

and they have

and have tried

to

develop some rules or modes of action by which they might
avoid wrong in breaking up the marriage relation.
Whatever rules or modes of action might be determined
upon, of them, of, course, fraud and pretense would avail
themselves.
But behind the whole body of practice in breaking up
marriage, we may conclude that there lay in consciousness a
moral question.

Had this not been the case no rules would

have ever come into existence by which men would be expected
to conform their action in breaking up their marriage relation.
When Christ came to deal with the mofal affairs of men,

-2the question, what was right to do in respect to divorce was
before the mind of the.Jew,is'h p1eople.

It had been before

the mind of that people for more than a thousand years.
was still a vexing question.

It

The solutions proposed had

never been crystallized into a principle that seemed to be
a guide to a universal practice.

So men were debating the

question for what causes a man might put away his wife.
The law of Moses was seen to be primarily merely a regulation of the mode of procedure when a man put away his
wife.

But for what causes she should put him away,

on that

there was debate.
This questiog vexeta was brought before Jesus Christ.
He took hold of it and 7ave it a treatment that like the rest
of his work in morals, seems to be jork done for all time.
The law of Christ as given to the Pharisees was that
no man should put away his wife except it be for fornication,
Matthew, XIX..
At this time women had very few rights under the Hebrew
laws.

The woman might have her husband killed for adultery

so strict were the customs regarding this crime, but that was

- 7

her only remedy.

Should she be brutally treated or neglect-

ed, there was no law providing for her relief.

These laws

however, allowed the husband to put his wife away if she was
Here a controversy was raised between the schools

unclean.

of Sharnmai and Hillel.-

The latter

claiming that the term

unclean applied to any offensive act or that it
used in

its

should be

ethical sense while the formcr claimed that it

applied to irmoral acts as adultery.
A man dismissing his wife was obliged to give her a
formal writing showing the rea on for sending her away.
This is

about all the procedure necessary then.

This was

the state of affairs when Christ spoke on the question.
Christ was not a civil legislator, but a supreme moral teacher.

lie did not establish laws of divorce but rather do-

elared that the existing code permitted many things which violated high ethical rules, and that the freedom then allowed
was entirely inconsistent with the true principal conception
of marriage.

Thereby Christ by a few words on this subject

turned legislation and usage into a new chaz::el.

A4

'IT. P!T:"-.,.

17

IH];

iu: a lTny boo}k an6

T.ih

OF DiVCCI&,.

you

find divorcc

,ill

treat-

ed under two heads.
Divorce a vinculo

1.

:iatrir-nii;

or divorce from the

bond of i arria., ;icd,

t r

..-. .....
cr as we usualy ,ay,

be;

fr

well be discus:d here,

will be tnablo to give it

this treatise ,ae

but in

table &ord

'(2,

,,o,!-

i.

The subject of a.Ulty

frI

--a

proper

at tcnt i on.
These definitions pretty clearly convoy an idea of the
of the :kind of divorce to wh ich

extent and the liritations
are severally aplied.

thei

The u~ie:t

the dlistinction setween the two is
says,

"

One is

Divorc,
of

that bond,

law is

total,

!'ro-

that of Blackstonc,

thie bond of ratrinory

in

who

the other partial."

and usually places

cnoe2~c:,

expression of

oth :

is

a tottdl sevorance
~atics,

so far as the

the esnc attitude toward each other,

toward every person else, as though they never had been

and

-5-

married.
This kind of divorce haa existed under some form, and
with varying regulations, by the authority of the government
t ha.

of almost every nation of ma-nkind.
the Jewish law, Greek, and Romain la-w.

its standing in

It h1ad its standing

in the civil law- that is7 in ±ha:t body of secular law which
grew up about the later Roman Empire and it-

succossorsa
in

The power to sunde-r the bond of rvtrimony for

Europe.

various and varying causes stancds in the statute law of many
of the modern nations of the continent of Europe.

It

stands in the statutes og Great Britain, and in the statutes
of most,

if not all, of t

Divorce is not known in

States of the Ancrican Union.
S,

the

oinmon

law of this country,

Properly speaking it was not known to the cormn-on law of England, but only to ecclesiastical law.

Vie shall have occasion

further on to discuss the drift of legislation upon divorce
from the bonds of riatriraony.
Divorce

. -

the marriage bond.
other,

so far as to

. t thora, is only -)artial

sverance of

It separates the parties from each
cmuad c:.oh tc the libctvJ of 'is

and her

o,vn
...... > -I co

trol unfl

,_Lh'eu

evidernt forelooking in such ....

.id rounio: cf

tion
VXXV

:e.e

,

ma:

i o

It

a

is

an

i. rocctcilia-1t1,.e.....,

tt*

sitution.

ro-rs ,,e
: '

hcT bdc,diorce

7o

rust all the evils of the

to

a disci-)inary

unc!(e,

such roc rictiou~

Thr c

r'

r: rtv of --e.

)

the

Vol.

":

by wat',

c-

fr-

._

a

meant

"hi,
e-- a

bo ard,

authoritios doc"e, d ':Tisc to

the'-' ohv

12111(

of the

of matrimony.

the 'co-

u -i5.to

.s its

h

.ractice of the Cath-

o-vi

l . t. 0r-m
o- ...

This

ii- tlnu Chrch,-

of t.e cifficultie,
It

Church to allo

divorce

.c

-the

Ch.rc,-rcl Cii:
as itt

C

oi

of divorce

'.1her

-

Di~ore
7Ct

c, otreer.

,,',

-iao
de c-f'

other

tt-s' " 'e.i..

f la:s and boo's: of -

va-h, o"f

letiOns is

know;,__ as thie oanon law
'Thn
;rto

Crist.ins
hcae

IEay of t1,cn recognized

this canion law, and turned over to the church courts the subjects which it

covere

7T'ere for centuries ....

This was the case in
r-

a

-

t

_'_lrc ..

lnind,
ont to

-7-

courts,

ecclesiastic,.

-ut until the yet:l

on law.

co.m.on l ,, '

J:Lb_
ite
...

and .';.

3por.'ins to cal-

187, writ right Lo callcd the

of riorcc

v-,

ca -;

lay;--

growth of the ro-1ilations of the church.

the out-

Tilil that year in

that coiz.try divo-rces for adltery even could be only from
bed and board.
~cisiuticJ.coaits
he

'~

Sountry.

Div(o..

7-omr

has

i.c

hore
1t_,.-

Prob ably all of tic s tAtes

divorce.
f-rom

bd.

:rov

o7y

d'l

in this

,-t

by statute.

tstLutcs o:'

th(u

subject of

In very !.iany, provisions are na.c for divorce
and board.

so construedid,
.e
cause,

not

in

that it

to bring

. "ill

some of the states the statutes are

is

at the option of a party,
...
-he a vicl

for divorcc,

eithx

for any

a vinculo or a

mensa.
There is

great need of a better understaning of the

philosophy and use of divorc,:, a

onv'nsa.

It

has little

stand-

ing in the lav and in the social practice of the people of
this nation that miry of the States
and regulfating it,
authorizing it.

and oone

L.ve

:r.vc rece.tly

no statuto permitting
cpeale

tatutes

-8-

Certainly it is easy to conceivu of L case in which a wife
Tnight desire to be freed from the control of a drunhen hus-

Uho yet rni~-ht AconJ_tous ov (ven have sentimental

band.

scruples about total disruption of the marriage bond.
a woman ought not to beoy

Such

the statute law of the Stat.e,

up t6 the alternative of procuring a divorce from the bonds
of marriage, or of a
her
iring
miseries -aithout halrp from
society.

Even if a large percentage of applications for

divorce are for divorce a vinculo, that is no reason why the
State should not -rovidc for divorce a mensa for tI.o e who
desire it.
nature.

These arc most likely to be of conscientioua
Is the State to adapt its laws to the wishes of

the most lawless-- those who

ill push their advantages under

the lawo, to the _euatcst extreme?
Caxon, Todd,

in his article in the Contemporary Review,

well maintains the ground that the law.s ought to correspond
to the convictions of the

that those who have relig-

ious scruples ought not to com gulled to'violate those scruples
in order to obtain aid from the !a,.
Take now,

for cxan1le,

any state where there are no

provisions for d.vorce

It

a mensa.

has riany of tho Catholic

The Catholic Church p-actically,

faith among its citizens.

from time imemorial, has allowed to her adherents divorce a
mensa, and has resolutely prohibited., and d"oes still prohibit
Yet this State provides only for

divorco a vinculo.

divorce a vinculo by the statutes.
stand.ing! insult and practical

Its statute. law is

a

injury to all citizens of

Catholic faith.
P2-otestantism is

working its

Vray

into something like

'unitywith the Catholic Church on the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds.

Any State in compelling all divorces to be

a vinculo, is as offensive to the thoughtful and conscientous
Protestant as to scrupulous Catholic.

When the greater

measure of' relief offered 'y the state for the ills of marriage is a violation of the princit2.es of the most religious
of its citizens, it certainly ought to allow the less measure
which they might desire.

To allow divorce a mensa is defen-

sible every way.
The government is in various ways constantly exercising,
incidentally the principle of divorce a nensa-

sometimes

-1Oupon the motion of one of the pt:-ei
times upon its

some-

in r:iagO

own motion iii spite of? the :)rotest,: of both

parties.
If

a rai breahs the peace by cothe State taP o

tory T'onothor

a d incarccrate-

fanil'

assault and bat-

ittinr

a mTnu

commit an assault,

deadly in

the person of his wifc,

the St -te

or

interfere

_-s.oinSt her co-nsent,

That is

him Ii- the Cownon jail.

so-ar:tion from bed a:md board of the :u ban.
If

bo.-o-, of his

fim from th~

a

and viife.
its

nature, upon

:on ct
-,,y her instigation,
.

brea

up the control h e

may have over hi'r person by imprisoning him for a long term
of years.
not intorfer,

In

the exercise of this right the stat.

doos

v:ith the marriage bond.

Sufficient basis for &ivcrcc a mensa may be f una in
this police pover.

anr in doi

so it

Society may provide f.r
::.ay incor

principle of" divorce,

orute into its
one -1-cns
cn-s

its

owrn peace,

stat utes, the
of sedurin:

that

peace.
It

must be aditted that divorcc

standing with the lawyers.

z Lo.-

a is

not in the

You find nw a.d then a

-11statement of a Court or a judge in
that trails

its

some forner gencration

way without question dovrn through all the

law books.
Well toward a hundred years ago Lord Stowell, said that

divo >

-a

>a

ift

the parties

"

in

the undefined and dan-

gerous character of a wife without a husband,
without a wife".

and a husband

In arguments against the principles of

divorce a rionsa in the law books that is still quoted as
supreme wisdom.

Now, that a hundred Fears ago the brutal

class in English society, low and high, wet

sufficiently

numerous to create a kind of public sentiment that a woman
who was not under the special protection of some

aa

was law-

ful plunder for whoever could -cssess hir.isclf of her, is not
to be denied.

It is not to be denied that divorce a mensa

to the brutal instinct did reduce a wman to the condition
of a candidate for its game.

But it is suggested that

there is no further necessity of preserving Lord Stowell's
remark in

modern law treatises.

Bishop, in his treatise on divorco, which is so really
valuable as to hold the field against all others, hesitates

-12-

not to reveal,
ciple if

evon spitefully,

-u
divorce a ric:-ia.

his antagonism to the prindcsign... es it as

ill-be-

gotten monster made up of )ioU.s doctrine and worldly stupidity",

With statements cast in that form there is not much

chance to argue.
One can only reply that the moral force which lies
behind the demand for divorce a mensa is really piety, and
that the intellectual conccption is founded not on stupidity,
but clearness of vision.

-1gDIFFICULTIES IN DIVORCE.

On the subjects for which a divorce can be granted
the statutes rango from no divorce a vinculo not even in case
of adultery, to divorce at the discretion of the court or for
genial infelicity.

When you attempt to gather up the general

drift of legislation you will find it will rin something as
follows::
Statutory grounds for divorce:
Adultery,

Impotency,

Imprisonment for crime,

desertion,

Neglect to make suitable provision, Cruel and inhuman treatment,J.habitual drunkenness, Discretion of the Court.
Some of these grounds do not appear in
In some, other grounds are added.
same cause is quite various.

some statutes.

The way of expressing the

But theXe are the main items

that find their way into the elementary law treatises for
comment.
Here we find ourselves in a predicament for when you
begin to make a list of causes for divorce, you cannot end.
You can think of other causes that are as rational grounds

-14fo7r divorce as these.

Mr. Bishop says that when you go be-

yond a list of causos something lihe the above, you come to
" ground uncertain, shadowy". Now chronic hatred or jealousy
is not "shadowy" matter in marriage.

it is easy enough to

conceive of a keenness of hate on the part of a husband that
,oulc be far moro intolerable than a maudlin good n-ature that
S

..

aoitual
o
drune

of co.e sta-tcs a iivorc'fi-ht

noss, b'-, it

s.

be .,oourd

.,ould 'be i rvossible to'obt'I.

Yet by the statutes
for t"c
'.
1c,

-

a livorce for

hate.
One party could be accohnmodated with a divorce for a
lcss evil;

while another would be held fast to a more bitter

fate.

There is no rational stopping place when

start.

You cannot specify a list of causes but human expor-

you once

ience will bring up something outside your list that will
appeal for relief to the sense of justice with more power
than many a case that will fall within the list.

And it

will be no out-of-the-way-, unheard-of trouble either, but
something that occurs, or may occur, frequently in human life.
Marriage is one of the greatest of human institutions.

No

-15other has a broader reach over the scale of human experience.
It is hardly possible to do anything like substantial justice
to the evils that may occur in married life, by specifying in
the rough, half a dozen causes for which a divorce may be
allowed, while the gates are shut on all the rest.
It is only coarse, crude work that the statutes are ablo
to do.

But the keenest misery may not lie along the rough

lines indicated by the statute,

as the subtile state of the

affections and moods of disposition cannot find statutory
expressions.
As the statute~of the numerous states are in such a confused condition4,the dccisicns of the courts, which construe
these statutes a e worse confounded.

It is no objection to

the wisdom of these courts that decisions have

oen reirdered

contradicting each other in all manner of ways.
culty is one inherent in the nature of the case.

The diffiSuppose

the business submitted to the court is to define cruelty or
drunkennss, or desertion, or any other statutory cause for
divorce, to say what degree of them, or either of them, shall
constitute ground for diviorce, and what shall not.

It is to

-16be soon at oncte, that the court is sot to solve a problcm with
perpetually varying elements.
Take cruelty for instance,

12r.ishop says," Of those

things in the law which require definitions there is no one
more difficult to define than logal cruelty."
may be stated that at one tic

or another in

Generally it
the attempt t,

define cruelty every concoivablo case has been decided in
every conceivable manner.
there is no difference.

Distinction has been made where
It has been decided that to slap a

wife's face is not cruelty, and it has been decided that to
throw a )ail

of water on her is.

It

has bcc

decided that

to wring a wife's nose is not cruelty, and it has been decided
that to spit tin her face is.
There is no need of bringing up other examples of the
conflict of opinion over other statutory causes of divorce.
We can see that the swne difficulties must beset the attempt
to define what druxikeCnness is,

or desertion.

For the variety of decisions that can to found on this
subject, as has been slaid, much accounts must be given to the
temper of the judge.

What is cruelty or drunkenness as

-17cause for a divorce with one judge would not be with another.
Men differ so Tmuch in

temnerment

and pirceCtlon.

If then

we attempt to specify by statute causes for which divorce a
vinculo should be 7ranted, we fin' that we are all at sea as
to the limits within those causes inside which such divorce
should be allowed.
We have the double difficulty boefore us of deciding
what ar
causes.

the causes and then of defining limits within those

-1-

THE LAW AS IT EXISTS IN THE UNITED STATES
We propose in the present article to give some account of the state of divorce in our own country.

This is

indeed a very difficult task in many ways as in this broad
field the materials are either to many or to few, or lie outside of our appropriate province.
The law of divorce must be gathered from the statutes
of a great many independent law making bodies, v7hich are certainly continually changing their legislation, so that supplement after supplement would have to be consulted to find
the latest wisdom of the representatives of the people.

Be-

sides this we might look at the procedure of the courts although it belongs chiefly to the lawyers, and is of use to us
in our investigation only so far as it affects the facility
of obtaining divorce.
The first point to which we call attention, is the divorce laws of the several states of the union.

Here to

avoid endless repetition we shall endeavor to bring the necessary details under a few heads.
No such details are furnished us except the scanty ones
in the notes of Chancellor Kent's 27th.lecture, (Vol 11.95-128)

-19-

Mr.Bishop,

in his standard work on marriage and divorce

(4 Ed. 183C), declines Xotting out in extenso the statute
laws of our several states relating to civorce.

Should this

be done "says he.:, a great number of our pages would be occupied with work, wbile very little benefit indeed would result
to the reader. " But is observable"

he continues,

"

that the

statutory law of this country, relating to this subject, seems
in general to have been drawn up by men who either did not
possess much knowledge of the unwritten law which governs it

,

or did not regard such unwritten law as worthy to be considered by them in framing the statutes; and who, moreover, gave
but little thought to the matter of the practical working of
the statutes.

The interpretation of these enactments,

therefore, becomes a subject of great difficlilty.
Coming now to the laws of the several ctates we shall
find that in some of the oldest ones their origin, has had an
important influence on legislation down to the present time.
The Puritans brought the English law with them, but separated
from it in the matter of divorce, by following, as they suppose, the rules of the New Testament.

Adultery and desertion

-20were then the only causes for divorce, and from this beginning their legislation following the analogy between desertion and certain other kindred offenses, degenerated until it
lost sight of the New Testament, entirely.

Other colonies

adhered more nearly to the English law, or,

as Maryland, many

have been influenced by the Roman Catholic doctrine of marP
riage and so confined divorce within narrower limits.

Louis-

iana has been subject to varying forces in the transition
from a dependency of France and Spain to the complete American character.

In the newer states various concurrent in-

fluences may have shaped the divorce laws, such as the views
of some prominent man among the earlier settlers, and the
origin, foreign or domestic, of large classes of their inha-bitants.

At first divorces were mainly granted by an act of

a colonial legislature in accordance with the practice existing in England.
In the laws of Massachusetts published in 1690, the only
provision we find in relation to divorce, is that all controversies concerning marriage and divorce shall be heard and
determined by the Governor and Council.

-21Kent states in regard to more recent timcs, that

the

constitutions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi allowed divorce only by two-thirds vote of each branch of the legislature after trial and verdict of a superior court,
of Chancery.

r a court

But later constitutions have, in all these

states, rendered such actions of the law making body unnecessary, if not forbidden its exercise altogether.

Kent adds

that in Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, the legislature and not the courts had power to decree divorce.

In

Connecticut and New York, where the courts had jurisdiction,
it was not exclusive, that the legislature of these states
occasionaly made tse of this power.

In 1836, divorce a vin-

culo were granted by the legislature of Illinois, without any
course assigned, and in 1837, by that of 1issouri.

But the

evils and the questionable tight of such special legislation
haVe in a great measure put an and .to it.
Such legislation is now prohibited by the constitutions
of at least thirty or forty of the states, among the rest by
that of New York framed in 1846;

and almost all the recent

constitutions contain similar restrictions.

The States of the Union, if looked at with reference to
their divorce laws, may be divided into those which provide
both for absolute divorce and for separation from bed and
board, and those which know nothing abcull the last mentioned
procedure.
After examining the statutes of the States, you will
find that about one-half authorize absolute and qualified
divorce.

In some States separation from bed and board may

be pronounced by decree of a court temporary or perpetual,
and may be revoked by a formal decree or judicial act;

al-

though it is usually confined to certain crimes, such as
cruelty, or drunkenness, or nglect to maintain the wife.
In other States, such as Rhode Island and Kentucky, it
can be granted for any crime which is a cause of a divorce
a vinculo, if the parties desire it, and the court think fit.
It may, also, be followed in some States by divorce a vinculo
if the parties are not reconciled within a certain period
five or ten years.
We now pass to the laws of the great majority of the
States,

and leadinF

characteristis

Of which are to grant

as

-23divorce, or it may be separation, for a great variety of
offences, to take no account of religious considerations, and
thus to aim at renoving difficulties which arise between partk
in marriage.
These laws of t1p

present time furthermore do not fairly

reproaent the original plan of the colonial legislation.

The older States in the course of timo have fallen far below
the strictness of their ancient lws, and the new ones have
started from the lower position on a downward path.
It

was natural for Maryland at first

to be under the

influence of the Catholic doctrineand for Virginia to follow
the model of England.

The Puritan colonies began their leg-

islation with two causes for divorce, adultery, and desertion,
holding that the New Testament recognized both of these as
sufficient grounds for divorce.

Such was the early legis-

lation, which continued substantially unaltered until after
the revolution shook aid broke off the old traditions, and a
new development of society began.
When now marriage began to be looked upon more and more
as a mere contract, when religious and moral considerations

-24were kept apart from political, when legislation, perhaps in
inexperienced hands, set about removing palpable evils without looking at remote consequences, when cities with their
vices and their population grew in size and number, when emigration from the eastern States gave up its lands and homes
to an inferior class of society, and in the west many of the
foreign settlers were trained up under loose laws of divorcewhen such causes as these were actingit is not strange tha
laxer principles touching the sanctity of marriage crept in
and expressed themselves i; legislation.

But aside from

these social causes of c7ange in the laws, some argue tha

it

was a kind of logical necessity for a broder system of divorce.
If desertion was a good groung. for divorce it might be
asked why should no; neglect to provide for a wife be such
also, which is akind of desertion, or imprisonmcnt which is
an enforced desertion.

There( are ot!er actions which lie at

the border of these, why should not they be good grounds for
divorce if the sufferer desires it.

And so, for ought we

know by and by, it may be argued that as the essence of the

-25marriage, considered in its spirit of love, when this ceases,
there is no good reason why marriage should not cease at the
pleasure of the parties.

Thus we come to the Roman method,

to the conception of marriage as a mere contract, Lnd to the
principle that incopatibility of temper or a new p.assion may
legitimately put an end to what

even the Romal lawyers called

the individua vitae consuetudo.
It would be a dreary and profitless task if we were able
o undertake it, to give an abstract of the laws relating to
divorce of a large number of the separate states.

All that

we shall attempt is, to enumerate the principle causes which
authorize the dis~colution of marriage
1.

Adultery.

in rnost of the states.

This can be followed by divorce .2verwhere,

the definition is substantially the same throughout

ard

the conn-

try.
2.

Desertion.

This offece is calid by several names, as

abandonment, however the sense in all the forms of expressiom
is no doubt the same.

The length and kind of desertion is

variously defined by the diffe rent states.
3.

Irmprisonment for crime,

.is absence or forced separation,

caused by the guilt of one of the parties in preventing the
For t

fulfillment of conjugal and family du ties.

:,ason
.is

and perhaps on account of disgrace also most of the states
regard this for divorce or separation.
4.

Neglect to Drovide for a wife's maintenance or support.

This lies

between cruelty and -7esertion. So it is added in a

number of statutes as a reason for divorce, or for separation
in
a.

those codes in

which separation is

knovmn.

In almost all the statutos which we have colsulted cruel-

ty under some lorm of words or otbr is a cause for either
absolute or qualified divorce.
any stato in which this does not

Prbably there is no code in
:pear.

It is described in

such phrases as intolerable severity, ( Vt),
(Me.),

extreme cruelty

intolerable cruelty ( Conn. ) , cruelty and conduct

rendering co-habitation unsafe for the wife (N.Y.),
Has it not we ask i- closing been made to appear that the
laws of divotce in this c untry demand thorou-h examination,
and in many states at least, a thorough revision.

And are

in

a demand

not all rightrainded people called upon to unite

that there be some check on so great and threatening an evil
as that which we have spoken of in this treatise.

